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Introduction
If the firm is a nexus of contracts, the stylized Japanese main
bank system is a nexus of implicit contracts. Of the many characteristics commentators often ascribe to it, take four:
. The main bank monitors its debtors more intensively
than the amount of its loans would suggest;
. It insures its clients against business failure;
. It loans its clients large sums, both long- and shortterm; and
. It makes arrangements () and () implicitly.
These characteristics raise two quite different inquiries: () through
() lead readers to ask why these phenomena occur; () should lead
them to ask whether () and () occur.
Implicit main bank contracts are not promises that chainsmoking CEOs make in ornate conference rooms. Neither are they
promises made in dimly-lit Akasaka restaurants while sipping Scotch
and flirting with hostesses. Instead, implicit contracts are promises
they never made, for had they made them, they would not be implicit. Make no mistake. It may be a simple definitional matter, but
it is a basic one. An agreement is not “implicit” just because it may be
unwritten or incomplete. Even if oral and incompletely specified, it
will still be an explicit and (generally) court-enforceable contract.
Judges may prefer written and complete agreements, but they know
how to handle swearing contests over who promised what to


Or, as Aoki, Patrick, and Sheard () nicely put it, “a nexus of relationships.”

Many discussions add a further characteristic: the main bank buys stock
in its clients. For an explanation of this phenomenon based on insider trading,
see Ramseyer ().
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whom. Instead, in most cases a contract is implicit if but only if no
one explicitly made it. That Japanese main bank contracts are implicit thus implies that few Akasaka hostesses have ever seen a bank
officer agree either to monitor debtors disproportionately or to insure
them against failure. Most scholars of Japanese main
banks—whether in this volume or elsewhere—ask why banks and
debtors tacitly cut these bizarrely unspoken deals. In this chapter, I
ask whether they cut them at all.
In comparing the American and Japanese legal regimes, I suggest three discrete hypotheses. First, Japanese firms borrow more
heavily from banks than American firms in part because of regulatory structures (section ). During the late s and early s,
regulated interest rates more closely tracked market rates in Japan
than in the United States; during most of the post–World War II
decades, regulation made the bond market a less cost-effective source
of funds in Japan than in the United States. For both reasons, firms
in Japan had less incentive to avoid the bank loan market.
Second, given the size and character of banking transactions, rational bankers and borrowers will generally negotiate their contracts
explicitly (section ). If they do not draft contracts about issue X
explicitly, one should not conclude they draft them implicitly. One
should conclude they draft no contracts about X at all.
Third, Japanese banks may rescue borrowers when they do because the legal system keeps them from committing themselves to
jettisoning them (section ). By punishing banks that intervene in
their borrowers’ affairs, perhaps American judges enable banks more
credibly to commit to letting troubled firms die. Because Japanese
judges do not punish such banks, perhaps they do not let them
commit. Even though Japanese banks would prefer to commit to
jettisoning troubled borrowers, perhaps they cannot.


Japanese law has no general statute of frauds requiring contracts to be i n
writing, though various exceptions exist (Suekawa, –). On the requirements
for insurance contracts, see Egashira (–); Shoho [Commercial Code], law
no.  of , § .

Notable exceptions include Miwa (, , : –); Horiuchi,
Packer, and Fukuda; and Horiuchi.
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. The Heavy Japanese Reliance on Bank Debt
.. Differential reliance
Most scholars claim Japanese firms rely more heavily on bank
debt than do American firms. Although they all find idiosyncratic
ways of measuring the reliance and although much depends on accounting definitions, they usually conclude the same: Japanese firms
borrow a bigger share of the money they need from banks than do
American firms. The Bank of Japan, for example, found that in 
American firms borrowed  cents from banks for every dollar they
borrowed on the securities markets. French firms showed a ratio of
., British firms of ., German firms of ., and Japanese firms
of .. During the three preceding years, American firms borrowed
. times as much from banks as through securities, and Japanese
firms borrowed . times as much (Kitahara, , ). Whether in
the United States or Japan, most small firms cannot issue bonds.
Were one to examine the debt patterns only of the bigger firms, the
cross-national differences would loom larger still.
Much of this difference stems from two sources. First, some of it
stems from the heavy disintermediation that occurred in the United
States in the late s and early s; accordingly, section . outlines the interest-rate regulations that contributed to that phenomenon. Second, some of it stems from aspects of the Japanese securities market that raised the costs of securitized finance; section .
traces the source of those costs.
.. Interest-rate policy
American policy. During the half-century before the mid-s,
American bureaucrats limited the interest banks could pay their depositors. In the late s, however, they let inflation drive market


The only exception I located was Royama, who found a largely similar
dependence on bank loans by American and Japanese firms until the mid-s.

For example, from  to  Japanese firms with paid-in capital of under
one billion yen consistently raised less than one percent of their funds in the
bond market (Kamochi, ).

Banking Act of ,  Stat. , codified as  U.S.C. §§ a, b
(Federal Reserve Board member banks);  U.S.C. § (g) (FRB nonmember
banks); former Regulation Q,  C.F.R. § , revoked by  Fed. Reg. 
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interest rates high. While the prime rate neared  percent, individual savings accounts paid  percent interest or less, and corporate and
checking accounts paid  percent. By early  the difference between the treasury bill yield and the regulated rate on one-year time
deposits (pegged at  percent) reached . percent. By mid-, it
topped  percent (see table ). The difference between the T-bill rate
and the pass-book savings rate (pegged at various rates from  percent to . percent) hit . percent (Board, tab. .).
Effectively, the divergence between the market and regulated
rates created a rent. To be sure, the banks may have competed some
of it away. If they did not, however, depositors and borrowers could
avoid it by circumventing the banks and transacting directly. Increasingly, they did. While market rates stayed low, corporate treasurers could cite convenience to justify keeping cash in zero-interest
demand accounts. When market rates rose, so did the opportunity
cost of keeping their cash there. Increasingly, they chose not to incur that cost.
Instead, treasurers with money to park placed their money in the
commercial paper (CP) market—the market for short-term unsecured corporate obligations. Other treasurers turned to the market
to borrow. In , firms had raised $. billion in the CP market.
By , they had raised $. billion and by , $ billion.
();  Fed. Res. Bull.  (interpreting definition of savings account i n
Reg. Q to exclude corporate accounts), reproduced in CCH Federal Banking
Law Reporter § , ..

Note that American banks did offer market returns to their largest customers. Since , they had sold negotiable certificates of deposit (CDs). Although the Federal Reserve Board had initially applied Regulation Q to the
certificates, by  it exempted them entirely (Loring and Brundy, ).
Hence, during the late s American corporate treasurers could earn market
rates by buying these CDs. Because they could always liquidate their investment at the discounted present value of the certificate pay-out, the CDs gave
them both market returns and liquidity.

Litt, Macey, Miller, and Rubin (); Kohn (); Stigum (, ). Note
that much of what is thought to be disintermediation in the United States is
instead intermediated finance through the nonbank sector. Although the
amount of commercial paper outstanding (generally cited as an index of disintermediation) in the American market in  was $ billion, $ billion of
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that amount was issued by such financial intermediaries as finance companies
(e.g., GMAC). Kohn (–); Stigum (, ).
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Table . The Interest-Rate Gap
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Notes and sources:
aGovernment bond yield, as given in International Monetary
Fund, International Financial Statistics (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, various months).
bBank of Japan “guideline” interest rate applicable to one-year
time deposits, in effect at the end of each quarter. See Nihon
ginko chosa tokei kyoku, Keizai tokei geppo [Economic Statistics
Monthly] tab.  (Tokyo: Nihon ginko, various months).
cDifference between market rate and regulated rate.
eThree-month treasury bill yield, as given in International
Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics (Washington,
D.C.: International Monetary Fund, various months).
fMaximum legal interest rate applicable to one-year time deposits, in effect at the end of each quarter. See Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Bulletin tab. .
(Washington, D.C.: Federal Reserve Board, various months).
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Individual depositors abandoned banks too. Securities firms had
offered mutual funds for decades. Now they offered open-end funds
investing in the money market. There, depositors found a close
substitute for checking accounts and earned  to  percent interest
to boot. Faced with these options, depositors fled the banks. Faced
with their flight, regulators abandoned the restrictions on almost all
rates. By , however, investors had already moved $ billion to
money market funds (Stigum, ).
Japanese policy. Although Japanese bureaucrats fixed interest
rates, too, they more effectively limited inflation and more closely let
those rates track market rates. Granted, they banned interest on corporate demand deposits. Yet they allowed near-market rates on a variety of savings accounts. Precisely because they let those rates track
market rates so closely (see table ), Japanese investors had less reason
to avoid banks. For most of the time between  and ,
Japanese bureaucrats kept the difference between the market rate
and the regulated rate on one-year time deposits under  percent.
They never let it exceed  percent. They did let the difference
between the market rate and the pass-book savings rate (pegged at
various rates from . percent to . percent) hit . percent in the
third quarter of . Otherwise, they kept it under  percent


See generally, Depositary Institutions Deregulation Act of , Pub. L.
No. -,  Stat. , codified in  U.S.C. § ; Garn-St. Germain
Depositary Institutions Act of , Pub. L. No. -,  Stat. , codified
in  U.S.C.S. §  note (mandating acceleration of deregulation). For the
revocation of Reg. Q, see  Fed. Reg.  ().

Pursuant to Okurasho kokushi [Ministry of Finance Orders] issued
under the Rinji kinri chosei ho [Temporary Financial Interest Adjustment Act],
Law No.  of , § .

Hugh Patrick suggests in correspondence that the treasury bill rate is a
short-term rate while the Japanese government bond rate is a long-term rate,
and that under most theories the long-term rate will be higher than the shortterm rates. Accordingly, he notes, this table may understate the contrast between Japan and the United States.

In , . percent of the financial assets in the personal sector were i n
time deposits (Suzuki : ).
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(Nihon, tab. ). On anything other than demand accounts, they
let corporate depositors earn interest like anyone else.
Although Japanese investors still earned positive rents by avoiding regulated bank accounts, they earned lower rents than in the
United States. And because they earned lower rents, so did the entrepreneurs who created the institutions necessary to let them avoid
the banks. Institutions are not free. With smaller incentives to create the institutions that would facilitate disintermediation, those
entrepreneurs did less to facilitate disintermediation in Japan than in
the United States.
.. The securitized loan market
Not only did Japanese investors and borrowers find bank terms
more advantageous than their American peers, they also had fewer
options. American corporate borrowers could raise funds in the bond
and CP markets. American investors could obligingly park their
money there. Before the mid-s, however, most Japanese firms
had almost no cost-effective nonbank sources for funds, and most

Suzuki (: -). Only demand deposits (toza yokin) paid no interest.
Overall, . percent of the deposits at the Japanese city banks were held by
corporate depositors in  (Akane).
Japanese bureaucrats gave the largest depositors significant market-rate options. For example, in  Japanese bureaucrats let banks sell negotiable CDs.
Initially, they set a -million-yen minimum to the accounts. In  they
lowered that amount to  million yen, in  to  million, and in  to
 million. Second, in  bureaucrats let banks offer floating interest moneymarket certificates. Initially, they set a -million-yen deposit minimum, and
let banks pay a rate that floated at . percent under the weekly Bank of Japan
rate for CDs. Soon, they lowered the minimum—to  million yen in ,
and  million and then  million yen in . By , they let banks offer a
new small-deposit money-market certificate. They originally required a -million-yen deposit, but then lowered that floor to  million yen, to , yen,
and by  eliminated the floor entirely. Third, in  bureaucrats let banks
pay market interest on deposits of at least  billion yen. Again, they have since
lowered the minimum—in steps (as with the other accounts), by  to  million.
In , . percent of the deposited amount at the city banks paid unregulated interest; by , that amount was . percent (Sadaki et al., ).
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Japanese investors had no cost-effective nonbank places to park their
savings.
American bond markets. Large American borrowers have long
been able to obtain funds through the bond market. Although the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has regulated most
sectors of that market, it has not (except with junk bonds) killed any
sector. In several ways, it has even relaxed the regulatory framework.
Through some of these changes, it has significantly cut the cost of
securitized finance. As but one example, take “shelf registration.”
Beginning in , the SEC offered it as an alternative to the traditional registration procedure. Borrowers must usually file elaborate
disclosure statements to issue long-term (over nine months) public
debt. Under the new shelf-registration regime, they can reduce the
cost of the process by filing a blanket statement covering future issues. Rather than register each time they needed extra cash, they
can now issue their bonds “off the shelf.” On a typical $-million
issue of fifteen-year, -percent-coupon bonds in the early s,
they saved $. million.
Japanese bond markets. Until the late s, most Japanese issuers—even many of the safest firms—found the bond markets
either closed or prohibitively expensive. The reason lay in part in the
political power of the banks. In order to protect the spread they
earned on the difference between the rates they paid on deposits and
earned on loans, the banks had to control the securitized loan


Rule ,  C.F.R. § .; see Clark (: –).
Present-valued aggregate savings. See Kidwell and Thompson ();
Bhagat, Marr, and Thompson. Although Japanese regulators now permit
shelf-registration too, they have done so only since the fall of . Shoken
torihiki ho [Securities Exchange Act], Law No.  of , §§ - through , as amended by Law No.  of ; Okura sho rei No.  of Sept. , 
(Yamakawa a, b).

The spread was smaller than in the United States, but larger than a
market spread. The banks did not maximize the spread between the rates.
Rather, they maximized the politically maintainable spread. The much larger
American spread quickly disintegrated as Americans developed alternatives to
banks.
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market (bonds and CP). After all, if large firms could freely turn to
a securitized market, they could easily circumvent the bank-loan
cartel. Corporate treasurers and individual investors could transact
directly or through mutual funds; corporate borrowers could issue
bonds or CP. Together, they could split the regulatory rents banks
would otherwise sometimes earn.
The banks did not disable the bond market entirely. Instead,
they levied a toll charge on firms that used it. Any rational monopolist would have done the same. Although bank loans often do
economize on transactional and informational costs (Horiuchi and
Okazaki; Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein ), they do not always
do so. Sometimes, securitized loans are cheaper. When they are, a
borrowing firm and a monopolistic lender can both gain if the firm
(a) borrows its funds in the securitized market and (b) pays the monopolist an access charge. The lenders will set that access charge
approximately equal to the difference between (i) the (effectively
unregulated) rates they can charge their borrowers and (ii) the
(artificially low) rates they pay their depositors.
Granted, no given bank would directly have lost monopoly rents
if one of its borrowers had issued bonds and used the proceeds to repay its bank loan. After all, the banks loaned their funds at market
rates. Collectively, however, the banks would have lost money.
Necessarily, whenever a bank borrower moved to the securitized
market, it took with it depositors who would otherwise have invested at the artificially low interest rates. Necessarily, every time a
firm issued bonds, the banks collectively lost low-interest deposits.
The banks collected their toll charge by managing the collateral
to the bond issues. The story begins in , when the major banks
(who were then also underwriters) collectively agreed to underwrite
only secured bonds (Kuroda, ). When the Americans bifurcated


They also, of course, had to limit access to the equity market—a subject
beyond the scope of this chapter. Note that legally CP is not a security i n
Japan. On Japanese financial markets generally, see Rosenbluth.

For a sophisticated analysis of the regulation of mutual funds in Japan,
see Miwa (: –).

They may not have lost quite as much as it appears, since the banks
themselves bought many of the bonds.
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Japanese commercial and investment banking in the s, the
banks expanded their group (eventually known as the Bond Committee, the kisaikai) to include the securities firms. The ban on unsecured bonds, however, they retained.
According to the law, only banks could manage collateral. By
requiring bond issuers to post collateral, the Bond Committee thus
could force them to pay banks a fee for using the securities markets
(Horiuchi and Sakurai, ; Aoki and Patrick). By pricing those
collateral-management fees strategically, it then could preserve the
banks’ monopoly pricing scheme. By all odds, it did set the price
high. According to one survey (of Tokyo Stock Exchange–listed
firms that had recently issued bonds abroad or made large private
placements domestically), . percent of the firms gave Japanese
bank commissions as a reason for selling bonds abroad (Miwa :
). On a typical -billion-yen bond in the Euromarket, banks
earned commission fees of . million yen. In Japan they earned 
million yen.
In exchange for cooperating with the banking cartel, the securities firms shared the regulatory rents. In order to obtain their acqui

Shoken torihiki ho [Securities Exchange Act], Law No.  of , § .
For an introduction to the Bond Committee system, see Minaguchi; on
the lack of a legal basis (or antitrust exemption) for the Committee, see Negishi
(–), Takeuchi ().

Tanpo tsuki shasai shintaku ho [The Secured Bond Trust Act], Law No. 
of , § .

Frankel and Morgan (). The “collateral management” services may
have been largely a sham. If so, then the collateralization requirement itself
may have been largely a wealth transfer from issuers to banks. Evidence of the
sham nature of the arrangement appears in the security interests themselves.
Many of the bonds were secured by a “mortgage” on the firm itself under the
Kigyo tampo ho [Enterprise Security Law], Law No.  of . Such a
“security interest” is not a security interest at all—but simply an unsecured priority claim.
Teranishi (–) interprets matters very differently. According to him,
the bond issues were part of a successful government attempt to target credit
subsidies to favored firms. Under this theory, the city banks bought the bonds
at supramarket prices and in exchange received submarket loans from the Bank
of Japan.
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escence, the banks priced their collateral management services
strategically: they priced them in ways that shared with the securities
firms (who collectively set underwriting fees) the monopoly rents
they as banks earned.
All this occurred with Ministry of Finance (MOF) approval. A
telling example of MOF’s role occurred in mid-. As underwriters
to the issuing firms, the securities firms had been selling at a discount the bonds they had just underwritten. They were reselling
bonds from new issues, in short, at prices below those they had paid
the issuer. Effectively, they were cheating on their own cartel.
Having quoted supracompetitive underwriting fees, they were then
discounting those fees by underwriting the bonds themselves at
above-market prices. Once it noticed the practice, the MOF—acting as “cartel cop”—intervened. Using its general police powers under §  of the Securities Exchange Act, it ordered the firms immediately to stop their price competition (Miwa : -, : ; Anon. : ).
In effect, the firms in the financial services industry (the banks
and the securities firms) had together cartelized the entire industry.
Whether a borrower tried to raise its money in the bank-loan market or on the securities market, they collected a monopoly rent.
Precisely because they controlled both markets, a borrower could not
avoid the monopoly rents in one market by raising funds in the
other.
Recent changes. Only recently did Japanese firms begin to borrow
significant funds in the domestic bond market. Although for
decades they operated a market in government bond repurchase
contracts (known as gensaki), that market was small for many years
and never gave banks much competition. In it, those firms that
needed short-term working capital sold their portfolio of government bonds, together with a promise to repurchase them (at a price

Miwa (: –). Obviously, in any given industry (like the financial
services industry) there can only be one monopoly rent. Having cartels among
both collateral management firms (banks) and underwriting firms (securities
firms) thus would not have increased the total monopoly rent exracted. The
contest between the banks and securities firms instead would have been over
the distribution of that rent.
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reflecting an implicit interest charge) within a few months
(generally one or two). Those with excess cash then earned market
returns by buying those bonds with the repurchase agreements attached. Essentially, the bond constituted collateral for what was a
short-term loan. Because one could not profitably sell government
bonds that one did not own, the market worked as a fund-raising
device only for firms that already owned them.
As table  shows, the domestic industrial bond market stayed
small at least until the mid-s. By the MOF’s own calculations,
in the first half of that decade the largest firms raised  percent of
their total funding through bonds, and . percent of their borrowed funds through bonds. For the smaller firms, the market was
simply not an option (Kamochi, ).
Japanese firms did eventually develop a large bond market, but
only because of events overseas. Primarily for reasons exogenous to
the banking industry, the Japanese government eased foreign exchange controls in the early s. European firms had maintained
an active market in foreign-currency corporate bonds, and these new
foreign exchange rules now let large Japanese firms tap that market.
In it, they could issue unsecured bonds. Effectively, they could avoid
the banks’ toll charge and a host of regulatory requirements besides.
When the government revised the foreign exchange rules effective
late , Japanese firms increased the money they raised abroad
from  billion yen in  to . trillion yen in . When it liberalized those rules further in early , they increased the amount
raised abroad from . trillion yen in  to . trillion yen in .
By , Japanese firms borrowed  trillion yen abroad.


The market is known as the gensaki market. See generally Tsujimura
(–); Litt, Macey, Miller, and Rubin ().

Large being defined as firms with one billion yen or more in paid-in
capital (Ishikawa, –; Kamochi, ).

Amendments by Law No.  of  to Gaikoku kawase oyobi gaikoku
boeki kanri ho [The Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Management Act],
Law No.  of .

Kuroda (: ); Okura (: ). Due to the domestic recession, bond
issues have fallen since .



C W P  L  E
Table . Bond issues by Japanese industrial companies
(billion ¥)
Year
Domestic
Overseas
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Notes: Includes convertible issues and issues with warrants
attached.
Sources: Okura sho shoken kyoku (ed.), Okura sho shoken
kyoku nempo [Annual Report of the Ministry of Finance Securities Bureau] (Tokyo: Kin’yu zaisei jijo kenkyu kai, various
years); Koshasai hikiuke kyokai (ed.), Koshasai nenkan [Bond
Annual] (Tokyo: Koshasai hikiuke kyokai, various years).

Once the large firms could issue bonds in the Euromarket,
Japanese banks had little choice but to ease the terms they offered
those firms. First, they let them issue unsecured bonds within Japan.
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Given that the large firms would raise their funds overseas unless
they let them avoid the toll charge, they let them avoid it (Kuroda,
–). Firms issued their first unsecured domestic bonds in the
s, and by  the Bond Committee had lowered its standards
to the point where sixteen firms qualified. By  four hundred
companies qualified, and the banks cut their collateral management
fees even on issues that remained secured.
Second, the banks acquiesced to a CP market. Because of the
gap between market and regulated interest rates, American firms
had been paying banks regulatory rents that they could avoid if they
could learn to borrow from investors directly. Through the CP market, they came to do just that. Japanese firms had not turned to a
CP market because they had had none, and they had not created a
CP market because of the political power of the banks. Although
the law did not explicitly ban CP (Takeuchi, ), it did not clearly
permit it either. With its status ambiguous, banks could threaten to
use their power within the MOF (power that stemmed from their
ties to the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, the LDP; see Ramseyer
and Rosenbluth) to interpret the ambiguity into a ban. Given that
risk, Japanese firms bargained first. Because of the competitive
pressure from the Euromarket, they did eventually negotiate a CP
market. Their politically charged negotiations took time, however,
and they did not obtain their CP market until late . Once they

See, e.g., “Zoshi hakusho” [Capital Increase White Paper] (: )
(October  liberalization), (: ) (July  liberalization), (: , )
(November  liberalization), and (: –) (management fees). Under
pressure from the Japanese Fair Trade Commission, the Bond Committee has
also been forced to abandon its uniform pricing schedule. Henceforth, collateral management fees are to be determined on the basis of individualized negotiations between an issuer and its bank. Anon. (: –); Negishi ().

Commericial paper is generally exempt from the registration requirements of the  Securities Act by either  U.S.C. § c(a)() (short-term
debt), § d() (privately placed debt), or § c(a)() (line-of-credit debt). On its
exemption in Japan, see Litt, Macey, Miller, and Rubin.

For nice summaries of the politics and ambiguities involved, see Litt,
Macey, Miller, and Rubin; Schaede.

Tsujimura (). CP was defined as short-term notes (two weeks to nine
months) of  million yen or more.
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obtained it, they used it. Within a year, the market passed the EuroCP market. By December , it hit . trillion yen (Stigum, ;
Nihon, tab. ).
. Explicit and Implicit Deals
.. Legally enforceable claims
Basic to any banking system is a legal regime that lets people
enforce and transfer rights to assets. The ordinary bank loan is itself
no more than one such set of (explicit) contracts. One party (the
lender) transfers to another party (the borrower) assets to which it
has a legally enforceable claim (cash). The borrower agrees to return
the cash after a stated time, together with a fee for using it
(interest). The lender makes at least the risk-adjusted return it would
earn on the cash elsewhere; the borrower pays no more than the
risk-adjusted return it will earn on the cash. Such are the usual gains
from trade.
Absent enforceable claims, many of these gains disappear. Most
lenders will not lend unless the borrower gives them the right to sue
if it does not return the cash. Many lenders will not lend unless the
borrower also agrees to repay them before it pays anyone else. Often,
such agreements lower the price a lender would otherwise charge for
the funds. Usually, they increase the supply of funds a lender will
provide. Either way, they increase social welfare.
.. Alternative enforcement schemes
Not that the banking industry would collapse without courts.
Lenders and borrowers can usually protect their claims in other
ways. For instance, they can hire private armies. Whether in New
York or Tokyo, they sometimes do. And whether here or there, the
problems are obvious. Private debt collection work may have made
the Corleone family thrice a box-office smash. It imposes large externalities on everyone else.
Lenders and debtors sometimes also keep their word just because
they hope to repeat the transaction. Assume a firm earns a higher
return on some kinds of deals than on others. The firm will try hard
to repeat such deals. If it must keep its word to ensure repetition, it
may even keep its word. The key, however, is the assumption: that it
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expect to earn supramarket returns by repeating these deals in the
future. Absent such future rents from repetition, rational firms may
renege.
.. Enforcement schemes in Japan
Although many differences in Japanese and American banking
patterns derive from differences in the legal regimes, consider first
some basic commonalities. Both countries have capitalist economies
and both countries maintain sophisticated courts. In both countries,
those courts protect most rights to private property and enforce most
consensual bargains.
That Japanese courts do all this suggests Japanese firms may not
use implicit agreements as often as usually argued. If courts will indeed enforce explicit contracts, rational parties will seldom leave large
deals to implicit terms. By definition, implicit contracts are not contracts. Not being contracts, courts will not enforce them. Not being
enforceable, rational parties will keep them only if they expect to
earn supracompetitive rents by continuing the relationship into the
future. Parties will comply with implicit contractual terms, in other
words, only if the future repeated transactions earn them an expected return larger than the return they can expect to earn elsewhere.
In deciding whether to negotiate the terms of a deal explicitly,
rational parties thus face a tradeoff. They will use implicit rather
than explicit contracts if but only if (a) the future rents (present-valued, of course) necessary to induce compliance voluntarily (the
minimum compliance-inducing rents) are less than (b) the costs of


Klein and Leffler; Ramseyer (); Shapiro; Telser. Some observers may
suggest that hostage mechanisms (Williamson) could support self-enforcement
in Japan. Although possible in theory, the point is unlikely to apply to
Japanese bank-borrower relations in practice. The most likely hostage would be
the cross-shareholdings, but because stock does not have relationship-specific
value, it does not work as a hostage. See Ramseyer ().

Readers will note that some rents will accrue simply from the mutual
investments in relationship-specific information. Unless these exceed the oneshot gains from reneging, however, these rents will not suffice to make the
deal self-enforcing. Moreover, readers should note that the same rents accrue to
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drafting the contract explicitly and enforcing it in court (the
contracting costs). Whenever the compliance-inducing rents exceed the contracting costs, they will draft contracts.
In the banking industry, this tradeoff overwhelmingly militates
against implicit contracts. The reason: the minimum complianceinducing rents vary with the size of the transaction, while contracting costs are largely independent of it. In the financial services industry, a firm that reneges on a deal will generally pocket the cash
advanced it. Accordingly, for it not to renege it must anticipate rents
with a discounted present value greater than the cash advanced. The
bigger the deal, the bigger will be the minimum compliance-inducing rents.
By contrast, legal fees are largely independent of the size of the
deal. There are obvious exceptions—e.g., the larger the deal, the
greater the incentive to find higher-priced lawyers. Yet the costs of
negotiating and drafting a contract depend primarily on attorney
hours, which in turn depend on the complexities and idiosyncrasies
of the deal. They depend only tangentially on the money at stake.
Typically, therefore, once the size of a deal reaches a certain threshold, the compliance-inducing rent will exceed contracting costs. At
that point, rational firms will negotiate all contracts explicitly.
Recall the contexts where scholars first developed the theories of
implicit self-enforcing contracts. First, many scholars found the
theories helpful in understanding labor markets. Where factory
the parties even if they draft explicit contracts—the parties do not abandon the
relationship-specific rents by drafting court-enforceable agreements.

Readers who complain that court enforcement is expensive largely miss
the fact that most rational parties settle outside of court by reference to the expected legal outcome (Ramseyer and Nakazato). Because the vast majority of
contract disputes in both the United States and Japan are settled outside of
court, the relevant enforcement costs for explicit contracts are not (the relatively high) litigation costs, but rather (the much lower) settlement costs. Note,
however, that the higher the costs of litigation, (a) the more likely the parties
are to settle, and (b) the greater the variance in settlements.

Note that the calculus does not change if rephrased in terms of the effect
that reneging has on the bank’s reputational capital and ability to deal implicitly with other borrowers. Whether the bank earns a return of z on one
contract or a return of nz on n contracts, the calculus is the same.
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workers could easily shirk and managers could not cheaply monitor,
employers could save resources by paying workers a supramarket
wage (i.e., efficiency wages) (Shapiro and Stiglitz). Second, scholars
found that the theories helped explain how markets worked where
buyers could not cheaply confirm product quality ex ante. Where
buyers could not check quality before buying, they saved money by
paying a higher price to an established seller. Rather than risk a fake
from a peddler outside Ueno station, they bought their Rolexes from
Ginza jewelers (Klein and Leffler). Last, scholars used the models
where courts could not reach the parties involved. Unable to use
courts, medieval international traders relied on reputations and
trading clubs (Greif; Milgrom, North, and Weingast)
None of these situations remotely resembles the Japanese banking industry. First and most obviously, courts exist and work. The
parties involved are not peripatetic medieval merchants, wandering
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Second, the stakes are high. Explicit contracts may not efficiently prevent factory workers from
shirking or street vendors from peddling fake watches. But these are
not factory workers earning thirty dollars an hour or street vendors
selling three thousand-dollar watches. These are firms with legally
trained staffs, law-firms within easy reach, and millions of dollars at
stake. Modern scholars use implicit contracts to explain why these
firms behave as they do on million-dollar deals. They need first to
explain why the firms reject straightforward court-enforceable contracts.
In response to this, some fans of implicit contract theory may
cite problems of verification: parties will prefer implicit contracts,
they will argue, where the deal depends on information courts cannot verify. Although hard to verify promises exist (e.g., to cherish
and obey, till death do us part), the putative main bank contracts
(e.g., to insure against business failure) are not among them. Creative lawyers can easily suggest a wide variety of verifiable indices of
business trouble, and can easily list just as many verifiable bank responses. They regularly (and explicitly) draft contracts that insure
fashion models’ legs, football players’ arms, and singers’ voices.
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Writing an insurance contract against business failure they will find
boringly mundane.
If insurance agreements seem unlikely candidates for implicit
contracts, consider whether disproportionate monitoring agreements are any more likely. In Japan, implicit contract theorists
argue, the main bank implicitly agrees with other banks both (a) to
monitor the debtor disproportionately and (b) to bear losses disproportionately. The Mitsubishi Bank, for example, may explicitly agree
to lend Iroha Sushi, K.K.,  percent of the bank loans Iroha needs.
At the time it does so, it may also implicitly agree to bear  percent
of the costs of monitoring Iroha and to absorb  percent of any
losses should Iroha fail.
It is hard to imagine a less likely implicit contract than this
Mitsubishi-Iroha arrangement, for it is hard to imagine a more
needlessly complicated agreement. If Iroha’s creditors collectively
find it efficient for Mitsubishi to bear  percent of the monitoring
costs, the straightforward way to reach that result is to have Mitsubishi lend  percent of the money. It will then have a greater
incentive to monitor (even if not precisely  percent) and will absorb exactly  percent of any resulting losses (provided all loans have
equal priority). Because the total loans outstanding will not change,
this explicit alternative will not raise any bank’s capital requirements.
And because Mitsubishi bears  percent of Iroha’s default risk under either scheme, neither does it reduce Mitsubishi’s diversification.


Note that if verification by a court is problematic, reliance on the bank’s
reputational capital will not solve the problem either, since verification by the
bank’s other partners will be equally problematic. If third parties cannot verify a
bank’s performance, then the value of the bank’s reputational capital will not
accurately reflect the bank’s performance.

See, e.g., Sheard () for a particularly insightful discussion of the
model.

Sheard () raises—and rejects—this possibility.

Sheard (: ) argues, however, that the borrower may prefer to deal
with several banks.
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. Insurance Contracts
.. Initial doubts
According to the traditional stylized facts, Japanese main banks
more often rescue ailing borrowers than American banks do. When
times are bad, the main bank cuts the interest rate it charges. When
firms start to fail, it decides whether they have any future prospects.
If they do, it loans them extra money and gives them extra expertise.
Through such moves, it insures its borrowers against business failure. Many observers consider all this an implicit insurance contract. Over the past decade, they have published several brilliant
studies exploring the phenomenon. Within this volume, they include several more. Nonetheless, it is clear neither that Japanese
firms would want this insurance, nor that they buy it. Consider each
point in turn.
Would firms want it? If a bank offered insurance against firm
failure, it would invite classic problems of adverse selection. Unless
the bank had perfect information, the least credit-worthy firms
would disproportionately apply for the insurance. Because the bank
cannot distinguish risk levels perfectly, the higher risk level in the
pool would cause the bank to raise the insurance premium it
charged. The safest firms in the pool would then decline the insurance contract, and the average risk level would rise further. The
bank would raise the premium still higher, still more firms would
decline the contract, and so forth. The process would continue re

Some observers describe the implicit insurance contract as something
close to a mixed strategy: the main bank agrees to rescue the firm with probability x, where x is positive but less than . Despite some suggestions to the
contrary, it is not clear why this would eliminate either moral hazard or adverse selection, so long as the main bank has less than perfect information
about the debtor’s strategy.

This is a fundamentally different theory from Hoshi, Kashyap, and
Sharfstein’s () argument that the main bank lowers the cost of financial
distress. They do not argue that the main bank necessarily offers an implicit
insurance contract. Rather, they argue that its presence reduces the transactions
costs of reorganizing distressed firms.
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lentlessly—until the market for the insurance disappeared
(Akerlof).
The bank would face equally severe problems of moral hazard.
Just as Barbara Stanwyck (sort of) played a nice kid before buying
her husband accident insurance with a double indemnity clause, rational firms would pretend to invest in low-risk projects in order to
buy their implicit insurance against failure more cheaply. Just as
Stanwyck then (sort of) tossed her husband off the train, rational
firms would then hike the risk level of the projects they undertook.
Some implicit insurance theorists argue that main banks can
prevent this moral hazard by punishing the incumbent managers in
the firms they rescue. Unfortunately, the gain to the firm’s shareholders from the moral hazard will often exceed the loss to the few
fired managers. As a result, rational shareholders can compensate
their managers ex ante for any punishment the managers will incur
if the bank later intervenes and punishes them. To do so, they need
simply to pay the managers a supramarket salary. So long as they pay
them wages that include a premium equal to the risk-adjusted loss
the managers suffer if the firm fails and the main bank intervenes,
both the shareholders and the managers gain.
Do banks sell it? Whatever the logic to implicit contracts, to date
no one has shown that banks actually offer them. Indeed, no one
has shown that Japanese banks more regularly rescue debtors than
American banks. Consider several bits of evidence. First, large numbers of Japanese firms fail regularly. From  to , a mean of
, firms with debt of over  million yen went out of business
every year (Chusho). Granted, most of the failing firms were small.
Yet that fact itself suggests the first caveat: banks do not insure small
firms. In turn, the caveat suggests the first problem: why not insure
small firms? Banks should find it no harder to monitor small firms
than large. Small firms should want the insurance as badly as large.
If (as seems likely) small firms generally run less diversified opera

These problems of adverse selection and moral hazard would disappear if
main banks had perfect information. For arguments that main banks have good
information, see Hoshi, Kashyap, and Sharfstein (: ); Sheard ().

Note that the main bank will own no more than  percent of the firm’s
stock. See Ramseyer ().
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tions than large, they may even want the insurance more. If banks
and large firms can negotiate mutually advantageous implicit insurance, so should banks and small firms. And if banks and small
firms do not find implicit insurance mutually advantageous, perhaps
something else better explains the apparent bank rescues of large
firms.
Second, several scholars who have tried to locate empirical evidence of the insurance have not found it. Horiuchi, Packer, and
Fukuda, for example, used data from the chemical industry to ask
whether main banks lowered interest charges to troubled firms.
They found no evidence that they did. Miwa (: chap. ) asked
whether main banks increased their percentage of a firm’s loans
when the firm fell into distress. He too found no evidence.
Last, no one has ever found any evidence that firms pay for this
insurance (Miwa : )—and absent that payment one would not
expect banks to offer the insurance. Some scholars suggest that those
firms which want the insurance pay a higher interest rate on loans
from their main bank than on loans from other banks. No one has
found any evidence that this occurs. Others suggest, more promisingly, that those firms which want the insurance route their main
bank a greater share of their fee-based business. Since all firms need
the fee-based services, however, this effectively suggests that all firms
might receive the insurance. To be sure, some firms use more such
services than others. Given a single industry, large firms will typically
buy more foreign exchange than small; given a single firm size,
export-oriented firms will buy more foreign exchange than others.
Nonetheless, the firm’s need for these fee-based services will seldom
correlate with its riskiness. If so, the bank cannot be pricing its insurance very efficiently. And if banks are not pricing it carefully, the
best conclusion about the implicit insurance contracts may be that
banks do not sell them.

Note (a) that the per-asset-value premium on the insurance could be
higher for small firms if they systematically have inferior management, (b) that
the premium could also be higher for small firms if there are economies of scale
to monitoring, and (c) that the insurance might be unavailable entirely if
owner-managers presented more serious moral-hazard problems.
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.. Equitable subordination and bank rescues
Consider, however, another possibility: perhaps Japanese banks
do rehabilitate large borrowers more than American banks, but do so
because they cannot credibly threaten to let them fail. Given that
Japanese courts will let a bank rescue a borrower without jeopardizing its rights in bankruptcy, perhaps Japanese banks find some rescues profitable ex post. By contrast, perhaps American banks abandon borrowers because they cannot cheaply save them. Given that
American courts sometimes punish a bank for intervening in its
debtors’ affairs, perhaps American banks find rescues more often
unprofitable even ex post.
The ex post incentive. All else equal, creditors sometimes (not always) have an incentive ex post to intervene and rescue debtors who
threaten default. Many firms find themselves in trouble at least
partly because they lack adequate cash—they find themselves illiquid
even when not insolvent. A bank that has lent such a firm large
amounts will sometimes find that lending it extra funds, even shortterm, pays. If it refuses to lend those funds, the firm will fail. If it
has secured its past loans, it may then receive a share of the liquidation proceeds—but its share will likely fall short of its outstanding
claim. If it lent its money unsecured, it will receive even less. Simply
by advancing such a firm cash, the bank can sometimes recover its
principal and interest in full. As a result, all else equal, American and
Japanese banks will sometimes be tempted ex post to save their failing debtors.
The ex ante logic. If a bank would find it profitable to rescue a
troubled firm ex post, it faces serious problems ex ante. Most basically, it will find it hard credibly to threaten to punish a borrower
that defaults. As the punishment will be unprofitable ex post, the
threat to punish will be incredible ex ante. Unable to threaten ex
ante, the bank can now sell only bundled credit-insurance contracts.
In turn, to the extent it cannot constrain its debtors, those debtors
will exploit the bundled contract by increasing the risk level of their


See Bulow and Shoven. Explicit contracts are unlikely to help much
here. Even if the bank explicitly stated ex ante that it would not help a debtor
in distress, it might still have an incentive to break that statement and defer repayment. Obviously, the borrower will not complain if the bank does so.
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projects. The bank will anticipate this, of course, and raise the price
it charges. The inability to commit ex ante, in other words, will create incentives ex post that in turn will generate adverse selection and
moral hazard ex ante. Disintermediation will ensue: firms that would
prefer to undertake lower risk projects will leave the bank-loan market entirely.
With small borrowers, a bank may yet be able to make its threat
credible by combining precommitment strategies with a concern for
its reputation. BCCI notwithstanding, for most banks the credit
business is an iterated game. Precisely because of the moral-hazard
and adverse-selection problems that bundled credit-insurance contracts aggravate, a bank may hope to cultivate a ruthless reputation
for not insuring its borrowers. If it lends money often enough and
discounts the future at a rate low enough, with small borrowers such
a reputation-based strategy may work (Kreps et al.; Rasmusen, §
.).
With large debtors, a bank will find it harder to make such reputational strategies work. Even banks that can jettison small borrowers find it hard to bully firms to whom they have lent enormous
amounts. College professors with southern California mortgages
may find their finances dominated by their local savings and loan.
But insolvent third-world strongmen with multibillion dollar loans
seem sometimes to dictate terms to the great money-center banks.
Models of repeated games and precommitment may explain why
banks adopt strategies that otherwise do not seem credible—but they
work only if the bank’s one-shot loss from punishing a firm is small
compared to its future reputational rents. When a firm’s debt is large
enough, the bank’s ex post unprofitable strategy will make the bank’s
ex ante threat less credible. When a large enough debtor threatens to
fail, even a ruthless bank may try to rescue it.
The Amreican law of firm rescues. Effectively, Japanese banks may
be selling implicit insurance contracts to the largest firms that the
firms do not want. When a large firm borrows from a Japanese
bank, perhaps it knows that—should it find itself in trouble—the
bank may save it. Even if the firm does not want the insurance, the
bank cannot credibly sell it unbundled credit. Unable credibly to
threaten to let failing large debtors fail, the bank has no choice but
to include insurance with its credit.
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Even if American banks less often rescue their borrowers than
Japanese banks do (a proposition no one has proven), that fact
would not necessarily show that willing Japanese banks sell implicit
insurance to willing Japanese borrowers. American banks instead
may be jettisoning their clients because their bankruptcy law more
readily lets them commit to doing so. The hypothesis follows.
By tradition, American judges have looked skeptically at creditors
who intervene in a debtor’s business. Those who do so, they reason,
may try to restructure the debtor to their private advantage. Should a
bank intervene, therefore, American judges sometimes subordinate
its claims.
At stake is the doctrine of “equitable subordination”: for the sake
of “fairness” a judge may subordinate the claims of a creditor that
intervenes before Chapter  in its debtor’s affairs. “[A]s a court of
equity,” Chaitman () explained, a bankruptcy court “has the
power to subordinate the claims of one creditor to those of other
creditors where the claimant has engaged in some type of inequitable conduct which has resulted in an unfair advantage to the
claimant or an injury to the other creditors.” Hence, a bank can lose
its priority whenever “the bank has taken control of the debtor, thus
assuming the fiduciary duties of a controlling shareholder, and then
breached those duties to the injury of general creditors.”


Interventionist creditors have also been required to pay various debtor
liabilities out of their own pockets (Douglas-Hamilton). Absent collective action problems among creditors (but only absent such problems), creditors could
vitiate the effect of the equitable subordination doctrine by unanimously agreeing not to argue the theory in court.

 U.S.C. § (c). See generally Chaitman; Clark (, ); DeNatale
and Abram; Herzog and Zweidel; Anon.; Collier (vol. : § .). For what
is probably the first discussion of the possible role of the doctrine in U.S.Japan comparisons, see Prowse ().

Chaitman (). For examples of cases subordinating creditor claims
under the doctrine of equitable subordination, see, e.g., In re Osborne,  B.R.
 (D.C. W.D. Wisc. ) (credit association’s claims subordinated to trade
creditors’ where association induced trade creditors to continue to make deliveries while debtor was in financial trouble, even absent control by association
over debtor); In re Sepco, Ind.,  C.B.C.d ,  B.R.  (B.C. D.S.D.
) (bank claims subordinated upon finding of fraud by bank agent in nego-
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At trial, banks argue that the doctrine prevents them from saving troubled clients. Nonetheless, many judges remain skeptical:
While defendant [i.e., the bank] argues that subordination
will cause members of the financial community to feel they
cannot give financial assistance to failing companies, but
must instead foreclose on their security interests and collect
debts swiftly, not leaving any chance for survival, the Court
is singularly unimpressed.
The bank in the case had restructured a troubled debtor and advanced it extra funds. When the debtor started to fail anyway, it
tried to ensure that the debtor repaid its debts to the bank. The unsecured creditors complained, and the court took their side. Once in
control of the debtor, the bank could not use its control to its private
advantage. Having tried, it now stood last in line.
American bankers have not missed this risk of subordination.
The problem “has generated much debate and fear among members
of the financial community,” DeNatale and Abram () noted.
Granted, courts do not necessarily subordinate creditors who intervene. They do so only when they think creditors intervened and
misbehaved. According to the usual judicial formula, they subordinate a creditor’s claim only when: the creditor “engaged in some type
of inequitable conduct,” the creditor obtained “an unfair advantage”
over other creditors, and equitable subordination is not “inconsistent
with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act.” Unfortunately, the
formula does not much help. Judges subordinate claims whenever
tiating with other creditor), aff’d,  F.d  (th Cir. ); In re Sayman’s
Inc.,  B.R.  (B.C. N.D. Ga. ) (creditor’s claims subordinated where
creditor cut off service in overly hasty manner); In re American Lumber C., 
B.R.  (B.C. D. Minn. ) (where bank controlled actions of debtor and
liquidated debtor in manner advantageous to itself but not to unsecured creditors, bank’s claims were subordinated), aff’d,  B.R.  (D.C. D. Minn. );
In re Process-Manz Press, Inc.,  F. Supp.  (N.D. Ill. ) (lender’s secured claim subordinated upon finding of control, domination, and fraud),
rev’d on other grounds,  F.d  (th Cir. ), cert. den’d,  U.S. 
().

In re American Lumber Co.,  B.R. at .

In re Mobile Steel Co.,  F.d ,  (th Cir. ).
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“equity” demands it and equity, like pornography, lies in the eye of
the beholder. Ultimately, American creditors restructure their
debtors at their peril.
Equitable subordination does not make bank rescues impossible;
it makes them more costly. When a firm hits bad times, creditors
will seldom lend more money without controlling the way the firm
uses it. Under American law, they can do so before a Chapter  filing only by gambling all: if the firm succeeds, the bank recovers its
claim; if the firm fails and the other creditors convince the judge
that the bank indulged its private biases, it potentially loses all. For
the sake of making credible threats, perhaps that risk often suffices.
Precisely because of this ex post risk to intervention, perhaps American banks can more credibly threaten to jettison defaulting debtors
ex ante.
The Japanese law of firm rescues. Japanese judges use no doctrine
analogous to equitable subordination. Granted, the proposition is
impossible to prove, risky even to advance. Few things in comparative legal work are harder than proving a categorical negative, and
doubly so when the issue involves a matter so entrusted to judicial
whimsy. Whether in the United States or Japan, in bankruptcy cases
judges wield enormous discretion. They can disallow sales, payments, and security interests, for example, sometimes even when the
parties complete the transaction before anyone files for bankruptcy.
Moreover, even though they may phrase it differently, Japanese
judges do exercise their discretion in ways that often resemble the
American judicial concern for “equity.” If a bankrupt firm repays a
debt to benefit one specific creditor, the judge may void the pay
I attempt no statistical analysis of judicial behavior because reported cases
never constitute a representative sample of disputes. On the impossibility of
using court verdict rates to prove the direction of the law, see Priest and Klein.

Often, of course, there will be public debt subordinate to the bank’s loan.
Because the indenture trustee cannot legally waive the default, rescues often can
be made only by the bank.

Hasan ho [Bankruptcy Act], Law No.  of , §  (grounds for disallowing creditor claims); Kaisha kosei ho [Corporate Reorganization Act], Law
No.  of , §  (same). See generally Matsushita.
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ment. If it repays a debt knowing that it thereby harms other
creditors and the payee knows that too, the judge may void the payment. If it sells real estate (even at fair market value) and might
squander the cash, the judge may void the sale. And if a debtor
grants a security interest after it has started to default on its notes, a
judge may void the security interest. What one does not see in these
cases, however, is any equivalent of equitable subordination—any
series of decisions where judges voided security interests to punish a
major secured creditor who intervened in the debtor’s affairs.
Without such a doctrine, a creditor will more often find such intervention profitable ex post. Profitable ex post, its threats will be less
credible ex ante.
The absent evidence. The question, then, is whether the absence
of an equitable subordination doctrine in Japan increases the incidence of firm rescues. To answer it, we need several pieces of evidence we do not yet have. First and most basically, if the proposition
is true, then (all else equal) Japanese banks should more readily rescue
troubled firms than American banks. We do not know this. We
know only that both Japanese and American banks rescue a few
large troubled firms and jettison most others.
Second, large Japanese debtors should be at a greater disadvantage in the loan market than large American debtors. According to
the hypothesis, (a) the absence of equitable subordination prevents
Japanese banks from commiting to jettisoning borrowers with large
debts to the bank, (b) the presence of the doctrine allows American
banks to make that commitment, and (c) reputational considerations


Ito v. Hayasaka,  Saihan minshu , - (S. Ct. July , ); Usui
v. Nomura,  Daishin’in minshu  (S. Ct. Dec. , ).

Yumoto v. Makara,  Saihan minshu  (S. Ct. May , ).

Ito v. Uno,  Hanrei jiho  (S. Ct. June , ); Nakayama v.
Nonaka,  Daishin’in minshu ,  (S. Ct. Apr. , ).

K.K. Yamagata ginko v. Nomura,  Kakyu minshu  (Sendai H. Ct.
Aug. , ). According to Shimojima (), recorded security interests cannot
be voided in bankruptcy proceedings, but unrecorded interests can. See Ito v .
Hayasaka,  Saihan minshu  (S. Ct. July , ). Even recorded security
interests can be voided in reorganization proceedings. See Akagi v. K. K.
Menzu roman,  Hanrei jiho  (Kobe D.C. Feb. , ).
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enable both Japanese and American banks to commit to jettisoning
borrowers with small debts. If so, then large American debtors
should do better in the credit market relative to small American
debtors than large Japanese debtors do relative to small Japanese
debtors. On this too we have no evidence.
Third, Japanese debtors should try to keep their debts at any one
bank small. If the hypothesis is true, then Japanese debtors will try
harder than American firms do to avoid borrowing large amounts
from any one bank. We do know that Japanese firms diversify their
borrowings (Ramseyer ). Unfortunately, we do not know
whether, all else equal, they do so more than American firms.
Last, the absence of equitable subordination in Japan should
promote disintermediation. If the absence of equitable subordination
prevents Japanese banks from credibly committing to jettisoning
troubled clients, it necessarily forces them to bundle “implicit insurance contracts” with the credit they sell. Because moral hazard and
adverse selection will raise the price banks must charge for these
bundled credit-insurance contracts, low-risk firms will try to avoid
the bundled package. The best way to do that is to leave the bankloan market entirely.
Japanese firms have started to leave the bank-loan market. From
 to , firms increased the amounts they raised through bond
issues nearly fourfold (table ). According to Hoshi, Kashyap, and
Scharfstein (), from  to , firms listed on the Tokyo
Stock Exchange reduced their ratio of bank debt to total debt by a
third. Those able to issue bonds not guaranteed by a bank reduced it
by over  percent. The safest firms, it seems, deserted the banks en
masse. As Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein () put it, firms with
“good performance, valuable investment opportunities, or valuable
assets” turned to the bond market. Only those with significant
“scope for inefficient behavior” remained.
Ultimately, equitable subordination remains a tenuous hypothesis. Most obviously, the only evidence we have on point is that of
disintermediation—and that, of course, is a phenomenon subject to


On some of the reasons multiple bond holders cannot as cheaply renegotiate the terms of their debt contract as a single bank can, see Roe.
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an enormous variety of explanations. Yet we also do not know the
aggregate effect of bankruptcy law, for equitable subordination is but
a small part of the picture. Although all American courts in theory
apply the doctrine, more is at stake. Some American courts treat the
doctrine skeptically. Some American courts punish banks for not
rescuing a firm (on the ground that the bank refused the additional
credit in “bad faith”). And most American courts let a bank safely
“rescue” firms so long as it waits until after they file Chapter  petitions. In the end, a basic empirical vacuum remains: although
Japanese banks help some troubled borrowers, they jettison most;
although American banks jettison most troubled borrowers, they
help some. Beyond that, we cannot say.
. Conclusion
As part of the institutional structure of an economy, legal rules
shape the deals firms cut. By altering the costs of alternative forms of
economic exchange, they alter the transactions firms enter. The
differences between American and Japanese commercial practice
form a case in point: some of the most puzzling differences may
largely be artifacts of the different legal regimes in place.
The Japanese main bank system (to the extent a distinctive system exists) may be one such idiosyncratic result. Recent observers use
the system to explain the large bank debts Japanese firms use and to
posit aesthetically appealing models of implicit contractual arrangements: agreements where one bank agrees with the other banks to
act as their delegated monitor, and agrees with the firm to insure it
against business failure. It is not that these models are theoretically
impossible. At stake are indefinitely repeated transactions, and we
know from the game-theoretic folk theorem that in such worlds
anything can be an equilibrium. It is rather that they are realistically
implausible.
Any differences between the Japanese and American banking
systems may derive from far more mundane reasons. Consider why
Japanese firms borrow so much of their money from banks. First,
during the late s and early s, Japanese bureaucrats caused
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regulated rates to track market rates more closely than in the United
States. As a result, investors and firms faced smaller incentives to
devise ways of avoiding the banks. Second, for most of the postwar
period Japanese banks levied a large toll charge (in the form of collateral management fees) on anyone who used the bond market.
Firms thus could avoid the banks through the bond market only if
they repaid much of their savings to their bank.
If Japanese banks rescue large failing clients more often than
American banks rescue them (an unproven proposition), consider
why they might do so. Japanese banks may rescue their clients because they cannot credibly threaten to abandon them; American
banks may abandon their clients because they cannot cheaply save
them. American law sometimes punishes creditors who intervene in
a debtor’s business; perhaps Japanese law does not. Hence, perhaps
American banks can more credibly threaten to let troubled firms fail.
In doing so, they avoid the moral-hazard and adverse-selection
problems they might otherwise face. Because Japanese law does not
penalize banks that intervene, perhaps Japanese banks often cannot
credibly threaten to punish defaulting clients. Unable to threaten ex
ante, perhaps they involuntarily sell their clients bundled credit-insurance packages. Unfortunately, we do not yet have the data to test
the hypothesis.
For all their analytic elegance and mathematical sophistication
(and they are both elegant and sophisticated), the recent models of
implicit contracts raise a more basic problem: if banks and firms
want these arrangements so badly, why do they not negotiate them
explicitly and draft court-enforceable agreements? If they did draft
an agreement insuring a firm against specified business problems,
the firm could rely on the courts. Although complicated contracts
seldom come cheap, for transactions this large they should come
cheaper than the rents a firm would need to pay a bank to make an
agreement self-enforcing. Notwithstanding those potential savings,
the firms do not draft such agreements. Perhaps the reason is simple. Perhaps they do not make them at all.
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